



J-2

**SEMI-ANNUAL
REPORT**

MARCH - AUGUST

1968

1
00:00:36,970 --> 00:00:11,360

[Music]

2
00:00:42,160 --> 00:00:40,360

as of April 1968 the various components

3
00:00:43,990 --> 00:00:42,170

of the j2 engine system had been

4
00:00:46,869 --> 00:00:44,000

subjected to thousands of individual

5
00:00:48,640 --> 00:00:46,879

tests more than 4,000 tests have been

6
00:00:49,300 --> 00:00:48,650

made of the complete engine system at

7
00:00:50,510 --> 00:00:49,310

ground level

8
00:00:54,520 --> 00:00:50,520

[Music]

9
00:00:58,630 --> 00:00:54,530

under simulated vacuum conditions

10
00:01:04,460 --> 00:01:01,060

and to test sites other than Rocketdyne

11
00:01:06,770 --> 00:01:04,470

Santa Susana field laboratory

12
00:01:09,530 --> 00:01:06,780

more than 4800 seconds of flight time

13
00:01:12,050 --> 00:01:09,540

had been accumulated on 10 j2 engine

14

00:01:15,289 --> 00:01:12,060

systems with all in flight operations

15

00:01:18,139 --> 00:01:15,299

notably successful

16

00:01:19,969 --> 00:01:18,149

get on the Apollo 6 mission one of the

17

00:01:22,310 --> 00:01:19,979

five s two-stage engines shut down

18

00:01:25,069 --> 00:01:22,320

prematurely and the single engine in the

19

00:01:29,399 --> 00:01:25,079

s4b stage did not read right after

20

00:01:34,649 --> 00:01:32,130

the cluster of 5j two engine systems in

21

00:01:36,060 --> 00:01:34,659

the S to the second stage fired on

22

00:01:37,830 --> 00:01:36,070

schedule

23

00:01:40,120 --> 00:01:37,840

and measurements indicated proper

24

00:01:42,160 --> 00:01:40,130

ignition and operation

25

00:01:44,380 --> 00:01:42,170

engine compartment temperatures were

26
00:01:46,810 --> 00:01:44,390
normal for the first 72 seconds of

27
00:01:48,520 --> 00:01:46,820
operation at which time the temperature

28
00:01:51,160 --> 00:01:48,530
in the upper region of one engine

29
00:01:53,500 --> 00:01:51,170
registered a gradual drop

30
00:01:56,530 --> 00:01:53,510
this was accompanied by a slight decay

31
00:01:58,390 --> 00:01:56,540
and engine performance approximately

32
00:02:01,180 --> 00:01:58,400
three minutes later the temperature

33
00:02:03,060 --> 00:02:01,190
climbed sharply engine pressure dropped

34
00:02:05,960 --> 00:02:03,070
then the engine shut down

35
00:02:08,630 --> 00:02:05,970
[Music]

36
00:02:11,410 --> 00:02:08,640
on the s4b the third stage of the

37
00:02:13,970 --> 00:02:11,420
vehicle the single j2 engine system

38
00:02:16,850 --> 00:02:13,980

experienced an almost identical sequence

39

00:02:19,550 --> 00:02:16,860

of events ignition and operation were

40

00:02:21,290 --> 00:02:19,560

normal at 68 seconds

41

00:02:23,780 --> 00:02:21,300

temperatures in the upper region of the

42

00:02:25,790 --> 00:02:23,790

engine decreased to a level similar to

43

00:02:28,010 --> 00:02:25,800

that experienced earlier

44

00:02:30,990 --> 00:02:28,020

it was noted that isolated readings were

45

00:02:33,240 --> 00:02:31,000

as low as minus 400 degrees

46

00:02:36,750 --> 00:02:33,250

engine continued to operate to the plan

47

00:02:39,360 --> 00:02:36,760

shut down at 170 seconds

48

00:02:44,030 --> 00:02:39,370

after 3 and 1/2 hours of orbital coast

49

00:02:48,410 --> 00:02:46,220

highly skilled research personnel were

50

00:02:50,470 --> 00:02:48,420

drawn from all Rocketdyne resources to

51
00:02:53,179 --> 00:02:50,480
analyze and resolve the flight failure

52
00:02:55,759 --> 00:02:53,189
but detailed review of flight data

53
00:02:58,490 --> 00:02:55,769
before the proper operation of all major

54
00:03:00,610 --> 00:02:58,500
engine components

55
00:03:01,830 --> 00:03:00,620
turbo pumps

56
00:03:02,910 --> 00:03:01,840
- generator

57
00:03:05,120 --> 00:03:02,920
[Music]

58
00:03:07,280 --> 00:03:05,130
rust chamber

59
00:03:10,070 --> 00:03:07,290
leaving the ignition system with its

60
00:03:13,440 --> 00:03:10,080
oxidizer and fuel feed lines as the

61
00:03:16,350 --> 00:03:13,450
possible source of the problem

62
00:03:18,210 --> 00:03:16,360
the j2 engine ignition system generally

63
00:03:21,780 --> 00:03:18,220

referred to as the Augmented spark

64

00:03:24,780 --> 00:03:21,790

igniter or ASI consists of an igniter

65

00:03:29,280 --> 00:03:24,790

body and chamber assembly two spark

66

00:03:31,890 --> 00:03:29,290

plugs an oxidizer and fuel feed lines

67

00:03:34,080 --> 00:03:31,900

the ASI is positioned at the center of

68

00:03:36,940 --> 00:03:34,090

the injector that ignites the main

69

00:03:38,740 --> 00:03:36,950

propellants in the first chamber

70

00:03:40,720 --> 00:03:38,750

from the flight tended to focus

71

00:03:42,320 --> 00:03:40,730

attention on the fuel line bellows of

72

00:03:44,640 --> 00:03:42,330

the assembly

73

00:03:49,949 --> 00:03:44,650

isolated temperatures near this area

74

00:03:54,539 --> 00:03:52,229

the fuel line bellows consisted of a

75

00:03:54,930 --> 00:03:54,549

convoluted section supported by an outer

76

00:03:56,270 --> 00:03:54,940

braid

77

00:03:58,699 --> 00:03:56,280

[Music]

78

00:04:00,710 --> 00:03:58,709

this construction allowed flexibility

79

00:04:02,690 --> 00:04:00,720

for installation and afforded the

80

00:04:04,420 --> 00:04:02,700

necessary strength for high rates of

81

00:04:06,670 --> 00:04:04,430

blow and pressure

82

00:04:09,670 --> 00:04:06,680

with all data pointing toward a fuel

83

00:04:12,900 --> 00:04:09,680

bellows failure an intensive program to

84

00:04:14,880 --> 00:04:12,910

isolate the cause was initiated

85

00:04:18,540 --> 00:04:14,890

the immediate goal was to duplicate

86

00:04:20,370 --> 00:04:18,550

exactly inground test failure data as

87

00:04:22,680 --> 00:04:20,380

recorded in flight

88

00:04:25,230 --> 00:04:22,690

following a series of calibration tests

89

00:04:27,409 --> 00:04:25,240

a bellows failure was programmed into a

90

00:04:29,330 --> 00:04:27,419

j2 engine system

91

00:04:32,209 --> 00:04:29,340

data from this test was compared with

92

00:04:34,459 --> 00:04:32,219

flight data and temperatures pressures

93

00:04:37,429 --> 00:04:34,469

and performance ship were found to

94

00:04:39,619 --> 00:04:37,439

correlate very closely as it did in

95

00:04:43,029 --> 00:04:39,629

flight the engine continued to run for

96

00:04:45,730 --> 00:04:43,039

more than 100 seconds before shutdown

97

00:04:47,950 --> 00:04:45,740

supporting data was obtained through ASI

98

00:04:50,619 --> 00:04:47,960

assembly testing under a variety of

99

00:04:53,679 --> 00:04:50,629

ground level conditions with failures

100

00:04:56,139 --> 00:04:53,689

programmed into the runs information

101
00:04:58,839 --> 00:04:56,149
gained in these and in the engine tests

102
00:05:01,549 --> 00:04:58,849
continued to define a bellows failure as

103
00:05:04,189 --> 00:05:01,559
the source of the flight problem

104
00:05:05,569 --> 00:05:04,199
at the same time more than 300 component

105
00:05:08,059 --> 00:05:05,579
tests were made under similar conditions

106
00:05:10,009 --> 00:05:08,069
but with failures not induced

107
00:05:13,249 --> 00:05:10,019
they were conducted through the entire

108
00:05:16,399 --> 00:05:13,259
rain to extreme limits of bull rates and

109
00:05:17,860 --> 00:05:16,409
mixture ratios they were made both with

110
00:05:19,410 --> 00:05:17,870
and without propellant flow

111
00:05:25,570 --> 00:05:19,420
[Music]

112
00:05:32,770 --> 00:05:29,129
and it's severe vibration frequency

113
00:05:34,570 --> 00:05:32,780

individual components and an entire j2

114

00:05:36,140 --> 00:05:34,580

engine system were subjected to this

115

00:05:40,490 --> 00:05:36,150

type of testing

116

00:05:42,950 --> 00:05:40,500

in this series no failures occurred

117

00:05:45,350 --> 00:05:42,960

this served also to substantiate the

118

00:05:48,500 --> 00:05:45,360

findings of Rocketdyne review boards of

119

00:05:51,460 --> 00:05:48,510

quality of materials fabrication

120

00:05:51,470 --> 00:05:54,490

welding

121

00:05:58,660 --> 00:05:56,920

and what ninth ship were in accordance

122

00:06:01,960 --> 00:05:58,670

with stringent Rocketdyne and nasa

123

00:06:04,150 --> 00:06:01,970

specifications it was clear that Bella's

124

00:06:06,810 --> 00:06:04,160

failure was not caused by normal engine

125

00:06:09,719 --> 00:06:06,820

operation material quality or

126
00:06:11,779 --> 00:06:09,729
manufacturing processes

127
00:06:14,249 --> 00:06:11,789
as these conclusions were busy reached

128
00:06:16,350 --> 00:06:14,259
parallel investigations were being made

129
00:06:19,110 --> 00:06:16,360
into a number of other areas including

130
00:06:22,439 --> 00:06:19,120
bellows vibration as a result of fluid

131
00:06:24,600 --> 00:06:22,449
flow previous testing had indicated the

132
00:06:27,600 --> 00:06:24,610
existence of vibration resonances that

133
00:06:29,939 --> 00:06:27,610
is sudden amplification of stresses in

134
00:06:31,720 --> 00:06:29,949
the bellows as the rate of fuel fall

135
00:06:34,270 --> 00:06:31,730
vary

136
00:06:36,820 --> 00:06:34,280
in terms of the burners testing the

137
00:06:38,590 --> 00:06:36,830
metal vibrated uniformly except that

138
00:06:40,990 --> 00:06:38,600

those times when it's vibration

139

00:06:42,690 --> 00:06:41,000

frequency was in phase will better the

140

00:06:45,240 --> 00:06:42,700

liquid hydrogen

141

00:06:48,450 --> 00:06:45,250

at these points vibration of the metal

142

00:06:50,880 --> 00:06:48,460

was amplified thus at engine start with

143

00:06:54,200 --> 00:06:50,890

low flow rate vibration of the bellows

144

00:06:57,030 --> 00:06:54,210

was uniform as the Falls increased

145

00:07:00,450 --> 00:06:57,040

vibration was amplified at one point one

146

00:07:02,580 --> 00:07:00,460

pounds per second flow vibration dropped

147

00:07:05,580 --> 00:07:02,590

through the uniform level as full

148

00:07:08,770 --> 00:07:05,590

continued to increase then peaked again

149

00:07:12,320 --> 00:07:08,780

at one point five pounds per second

150

00:07:15,050 --> 00:07:12,330

and again at 1.8 pounds per second

151
00:07:16,830 --> 00:07:15,060
at twice the normal operating flow the

152
00:07:19,470 --> 00:07:16,840
bellows failed

153
00:07:22,370 --> 00:07:19,480
significant however was the vibration

154
00:07:24,560 --> 00:07:22,380
peak at 1.1 pounds per second

155
00:07:27,060 --> 00:07:24,570
this was within the engine operating

156
00:07:29,520 --> 00:07:27,070
flow rain

157
00:07:31,770 --> 00:07:29,530
would these vibration Peaks blotted and

158
00:07:33,870 --> 00:07:31,780
what grande test showing conclusively

159
00:07:36,840 --> 00:07:33,880
that the bellows would not fail except

160
00:07:39,000 --> 00:07:36,850
under the most severe flow rates tests

161
00:07:41,900 --> 00:07:39,010
were conducted in a vacuum to simulate

162
00:07:44,330 --> 00:07:41,910
the conditions of outer space

163
00:07:46,970 --> 00:07:44,340

in Apes excessive tests in this vacuum

164

00:07:48,810 --> 00:07:46,980

environment the bellows filled within

165

00:07:51,750 --> 00:07:48,820

100 seconds

166

00:07:54,400 --> 00:07:51,760

in each case failure occurred at the 1.1

167

00:07:56,740 --> 00:07:54,410

pounds per second flow rate

168

00:07:58,360 --> 00:07:56,750

when me studies to conclusions were

169

00:08:00,310 --> 00:07:58,370

warranted

170

00:08:03,100 --> 00:08:00,320

the resonant vibration pink was a

171

00:08:05,020 --> 00:08:03,110

critical factor and testing at a ground

172

00:08:06,790 --> 00:08:05,030

level environment was affording some

173

00:08:09,040 --> 00:08:06,800

type of protection to the bellows to

174

00:08:11,200 --> 00:08:09,050

keep it from Foley

175

00:08:14,050 --> 00:08:11,210

protection that is not present in outer

176

00:08:18,340 --> 00:08:16,450

two factors are present in ground

177

00:08:19,780 --> 00:08:18,350

testing that are not present in the

178

00:08:24,070 --> 00:08:19,790

vacuum of outer space

179

00:08:26,460 --> 00:08:24,080

one is moisture in the air the other is

180

00:08:28,290 --> 00:08:26,470

air itself

181

00:08:30,540 --> 00:08:28,300

studies were focused on the effects

182

00:08:32,050 --> 00:08:30,550

these two factors might have on Bella's

183

00:08:34,920 --> 00:08:32,060

operation

184

00:08:38,740 --> 00:08:34,930

it was postulated that the extreme cold

185

00:08:41,320 --> 00:08:38,750

- 400 degrees of the floating hydrogen

186

00:08:44,019 --> 00:08:41,330

fuel was solidifying the moisture in the

187

00:08:46,550 --> 00:08:44,029

air causing ice to form around the

188

00:08:49,190 --> 00:08:46,560

bellows during ground testing

189

00:08:51,019 --> 00:08:49,200

this ice might then affect the bellows

190

00:08:52,330 --> 00:08:51,029

in some manner that would prevent a

191

00:08:54,250 --> 00:08:52,340

failure

192

00:08:56,620 --> 00:08:54,260

tests were made with a moisture

193

00:08:57,900 --> 00:08:56,630

saturated airless environment around the

194

00:09:00,600 --> 00:08:57,910

bellows

195

00:09:03,330 --> 00:09:00,610

it was see if this moisture did solidify

196

00:09:04,980 --> 00:09:03,340

into ice around the bellows but the

197

00:09:08,010 --> 00:09:04,990

bellows continued to fail at the one

198

00:09:09,840 --> 00:09:08,020

point one pounds per second flow rate it

199

00:09:11,060 --> 00:09:09,850

was concluded therefore that moisture

200

00:09:14,710 --> 00:09:11,070

alone

201
00:09:17,110 --> 00:09:14,720
little or no effect on bellows failure

202
00:09:20,950 --> 00:09:17,120
at the same time tests were being

203
00:09:22,840 --> 00:09:20,960
conducted in dry moisture 'less air it

204
00:09:27,960 --> 00:09:22,850
was known that air turns into a liquid

205
00:09:33,059 --> 00:09:30,509
liquid hydrogen at minus 400 degrees

206
00:09:34,889 --> 00:09:33,069
blowing inside the bellows it was

207
00:09:37,350 --> 00:09:34,899
observed that on contact with the outer

208
00:09:40,410 --> 00:09:37,360
surface of the bellows the dry hair did

209
00:09:42,480 --> 00:09:40,420
turn into a liquid state

210
00:09:44,460 --> 00:09:42,490
increasing full rates of the liquid

211
00:09:47,550 --> 00:09:44,470
hydrogen with attendant increasing

212
00:09:50,280 --> 00:09:47,560
vibrations were then induced but there

213
00:09:52,650 --> 00:09:50,290

was no bellows failure it was apparent

214

00:09:54,870 --> 00:09:52,660

in that liquid being condensed on the

215

00:09:56,610 --> 00:09:54,880

bellows was affording some form of

216

00:09:59,670 --> 00:09:56,620

protection for the bellows during ground

217

00:10:01,880 --> 00:09:59,680

tests and it followed that the absence

218

00:10:04,310 --> 00:10:01,890

of air in the vacuum of outer space

219

00:10:07,420 --> 00:10:04,320

resulted in loss of this protection

220

00:10:10,060 --> 00:10:07,430

tossing the bellows to fail

221

00:10:12,220 --> 00:10:10,070

two measures of protection were given by

222

00:10:14,350 --> 00:10:12,230

the liquefying air and one can be

223

00:10:15,840 --> 00:10:14,360

identified through this cross-section of

224

00:10:18,450 --> 00:10:15,850

the bellows

225

00:10:21,330 --> 00:10:18,460

during grande operation air entered

226

00:10:24,800 --> 00:10:21,340

through the braid and upon contact with

227

00:10:26,630 --> 00:10:24,810

the bellows surface liquefied

228

00:10:29,530 --> 00:10:26,640

the liquid accumulated inside the

229

00:10:31,240 --> 00:10:29,540

pockets and was trapped by the braid

230

00:10:32,580 --> 00:10:31,250

this served to partially dampen the

231

00:10:33,850 --> 00:10:32,590

vibration at ground level

232

00:10:35,560 --> 00:10:33,860

[Music]

233

00:10:38,950 --> 00:10:35,570

the second mode of protection was

234

00:10:41,110 --> 00:10:38,960

hypothesized no mathematical formula it

235

00:10:43,120 --> 00:10:41,120

was determined that heat escaping from

236

00:10:44,620 --> 00:10:43,130

the Cooley hair was being absorbed

237

00:10:48,010 --> 00:10:44,630

through the middle by the liquid

238

00:10:51,140 --> 00:10:48,020

hydrogen in the convolutions this caused

239

00:10:53,210 --> 00:10:51,150

a lowering in the density of the fuel

240

00:10:55,100 --> 00:10:53,220

it was determined further that this

241

00:10:57,680 --> 00:10:55,110

lower hydrogen density within the

242

00:11:00,290 --> 00:10:57,690

convolutions as well as the liquid air

243

00:11:03,020 --> 00:11:00,300

on the outside of the convolutions would

244

00:11:05,750 --> 00:11:03,030

respect fellows vibration

245

00:11:08,030 --> 00:11:05,760

an analytical model was formulated and

246

00:11:11,450 --> 00:11:08,040

was mechanized for solution on an analog

247

00:11:14,870 --> 00:11:11,460

computer it was then shown that without

248

00:11:18,450 --> 00:11:14,880

hate the situation in outer space the

249

00:11:20,940 --> 00:11:18,460

bellows vibrated freely and would fail

250

00:11:24,889 --> 00:11:20,950

conversely the application of heat into

251
00:11:26,480 --> 00:11:24,899
the convolutions ever damping effect

252
00:11:28,220 --> 00:11:26,490
to verify conclusively that this

253
00:11:30,199 --> 00:11:28,230
application of heat would protect the

254
00:11:31,939 --> 00:11:30,209
bellows the series of tests was

255
00:11:34,009 --> 00:11:31,949
performed in an environment of heated

256
00:11:36,379 --> 00:11:34,019
helium this approximated the heat

257
00:11:39,600 --> 00:11:36,389
transfer characteristics of air but

258
00:11:42,510 --> 00:11:39,610
without the air itself to liquefy

259
00:11:44,310 --> 00:11:42,520
in repeated tests at varied flow rates

260
00:11:47,010 --> 00:11:44,320
of liquid hydrogen

261
00:11:49,290 --> 00:11:47,020
the bellows did not fail it was thus

262
00:11:52,110 --> 00:11:49,300
shown that hint as well as liquid air

263
00:11:56,530 --> 00:11:52,120

did protect the bellows by dampening the

264

00:12:02,110 --> 00:11:58,690

the ignitor assembly has been rain

265

00:12:04,239 --> 00:12:02,120

assigned we'll limit this motor failure

266

00:12:06,810 --> 00:12:04,249

the new design incorporates a tube

267

00:12:09,000 --> 00:12:06,820

assembly without bellows

268

00:12:14,030 --> 00:12:09,010

the peas no assemblies are in place on

269

00:12:19,009 --> 00:12:16,129

these studies into the phenomena of

270

00:12:22,999 --> 00:12:19,019

cryogenic temperatures the vacuum of

271

00:12:26,630 --> 00:12:23,009

outer space a transfer and their effects

272

00:12:27,680 --> 00:12:26,640

on fluids blows and metal structures

273

00:12:28,820 --> 00:12:27,690

included pure research

274

00:12:31,370 --> 00:12:28,830

[Music]

275

00:12:33,530 --> 00:12:31,380

the information gained and data from

276

00:12:35,120 --> 00:12:33,540

studies that continue are being